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Abstract: Ensuring the correctness of distributed system implementations remains a challenging
and largely unaddressed problem. In this paper we present a protocol that can be used to certify the
safety of consensus implementations. Our proposed protocol is efficient both in terms of the number
of additional messages sent and their size, and is designed to operate correctly in the presence of
n− 1 nodes failing in an n node distributed system (assuming fail-stop failures). We also comment
on how our construction might be generalized to certify other protocols and invariants.
1 Introduction
Correctly implementing distributed systems remains challenging. As distributed systems have
become a crucial part of the infrastructure, underlying many popular services, there has been
tremendous interest and work in improving their reliability. Interactive theorem provers such as
TLA+ [33], Coq [4], Isabelle/HOL [23], etc., and automated theorem provers such as Dafny [20],
IVY [26], etc. are increasingly used to check the correctness of distributed protocols [22] before
deployment. However, while these tools can ensure that the protocol meets safety and liveness
conditions, they cannot provide similar guarantees for implementations.
In response to this gap between protocol and implementation correctness, several recent projects,
e.g., IronFleet [14], Ivy [25], Diesel [30], etc., have proposed extracting correct implementations from
verified protocol specifications. These implementations are correct as long as these tools correctly
account for low-level system behavior (e.g., the behavior of Unix sockets), and can be incorrect
otherwise [9]. While these approaches are promising they have several shortcomings: first, incorpo-
rating low level optimizations, e.g., ones designed to take advantage of network connectivity [1,29]
or I/O [12], is challenging and can require changes to the underlying extraction tool; second, any
changes to the protocol, no matter how minor, requires extracting a new implementation since cur-
rent tools do not support incremental extraction increasing time and effort required for validation
and deployment; third, most deployed systems provide functionality beyond the basic protocol,
e.g., consensus services such as Chubby [2], ZooKeeper [15], etc. offer not just a basic consensus
protocol but also a key-value interface, support for leases [13], etc. and incorporating these addi-
tional mechanisms into protocol specifications is challenging and might even render these protocols
inexpressible in some of these tools. As a result of these shortcomings, at present hand written
code generally provides more features than automatically generated, correct by construction code,
and thus cannot easily be replaced. As a result adopting these techniques remains challenging in
practice, and points to a need for additional techniques to ensure correctness in distributed systems.
In this paper we take a different tack and propose a complementary approach which can be
used to certify (i.e., check) safety properties of a running distributed system implementation. Our
approach, which is implemented by distributed processes we refer to as certification agents, checks
whether inputs provided by the implementation satisfy a programmer provided predicate, which
encodes the safety condition being checked. In §3 we show that such a framework suffices to check
agreement and validity for distributed consensus implementations.
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To enable practical deployments, in our work we aim for certification protocols that are sound
(i.e., they correctly identify all cases where a predicate does not hold), complete (i.e., they do
not generate false positives) and efficient. In terms of efficiency this work focuses on certification
protocols where during a round of certification (i.e., one round of checking that the predicate
holds) each node sends no more than a constant number of messages, and the size of each message
is at most O(log n) bits (in an n node distributed system). In practice, beyond these asymptotic
bounds we aim for protocols which require each node sending no more than a few bytes for each
certification round, thus limiting their overheads. We also aim for protocols which exhibit message
locality, i.e., where nodes only communicate with a few neighboring nodes. The later is useful in
practice when certifying systems deployed on networks with heterogeneous link speeds. We discuss
some additional concern around deployment and use of such a framework in §5.
The approach we describe in this paper builds on recent results on how to distribute verifiers
in interactive proof systems [16, 17, 21]. In the context of that work (and borrowing terminology
from [16]), we aim to find 1-round distributed Merlin-Arthur (1-dMA) protocols and then execute
them in a non-interactive setting. In our setting the prover represent the implementation (which
provides us with inputs for the predicate) and the predicate itself; while certification agents represent
verifiers. There are well known techniques for translating interactive proofs into non-interactive
proofs including the well known Fiat-Shamir heuristic [7], however a naive application of these
techniques to our setting does not result in efficient algorithms, and we therefore use a different
construction here. Our problem statement is also similar to the previous work on proof labeling
schemes [17], however while that work focused on checking properties of the network topology, here
we apply this approach to checking safety properties of distributed protocols. We provide a more
detailed discussion of related work in §6.
Finally, while this paper focuses on presenting certification protocols for agreement and validity
in consensus algorithms, we hope in the future to generalize this construction to support certification
of safety properties for other systems. To do so we need to ask what are the limits on the kinds of
predicates that can be checked using a distributed protocol. Recent results by Naor et al [21] present
a construction for converting any centralized verifier which can be executed in O(n) time on a RAM
machine into a distributed verifier, however this construction requires at three rounds of interaction
between the prover and the verifier. Converting this to a non-interactive setting at least requires
a random oracle (that can provide the same random number to all nodes) and potentially several
rounds of messages, which might violate our requirements. At the same time, in developing our
protocol for consensus algorithms we found that most boolean predicates and arithmetic predicates
can be efficiently translated to such a framework, indicating that such a framework might suffice
for safety properties in several other distributed systems. We leave the question of generality to
future work, but provide a brief discussion on this question based on our experience thus far in §4.
2 System Model and Requirements
We begin by providing a system model, within which we describe certification protocols and
then state requirements for these protocols. We consider distributed systems consisting of n nodes
(e.g., a 5 node system is shown in Figure 1). We assume that a single node can execute several
processes which share fate, i.e., the failure of one process leads to the failure of all other processes
on the same node. We also assume that nodes are connected by a partially synchronous network [6],
i.e., we assume there are bounds on how long any computation can take and for messages to be
transferred between nodes. We assume that certification agents can communicate with each other
by sending and receiving messages.
In our discussion we assume that each node runs two processes: an implementation process
running the protocol being certified, and a certification agent ; thus allowing us to assume fate-
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Figure 1: System model: we show a distributed system with 5 nodes. Each node runs both a process implementing
the distributed protocol and a certification agent, which is the focus of this work.
sharing between the implementation and the certification agent. Each implementation process can
communicate with its local certification agent, i.e., the certification agent running on the same
node. We do not constrain the communication pattern used by implementation processes, nor do
we assume visibility into any messages sent or received by these processes. As a result our setting is
similar to that used in proof labeling schemes [17], with the certification agent in each node being
provided an input from the local implementation (referred to as a label in the proof labeling work)
and the certification protocol checking whether these inputs satisfy some user-supplied predicate.
We discuss our relation to this existing work in greater detail later in §6.
The certificate agents as a whole implement a distributed protocol to check whether the inputs at
all nodes satisfy some predicate. We assume that a safety condition is violated when the predicate
does not hold, and thus require that at least one (out of n) certification agent signal an error
whenever the predicate is violated. Note, that the requirement that at least one node signal an
error is very weak, since we can neither assume that a particular node will always signal errors
during predicate violations, nor that all nodes will signal violations. This means that in practice
using a certification protocol to check correctness requires a process or administrator to monitor all
nodes for error messages, however this allows the use of protocols that can operate in significantly
weaker failure models than consensus algorithm (surviving n− 1 node failures).
A certification round is invoked by the implementation process on a node when it sends a
message to the local certification agent. In what follows, for ease of exposition, we assume that
implementations at all nodes invoke the certification agent within a short time bound, however
we note that this assumption can be relaxed by allowing certificate agents to query the local
implementation process for input. We make our description more concrete in the next section.
We require correct certification protocols to provide both soundness and completeness. We de-
fine a certification protocol which evaluates a predicate P to be sound if at least one node signals
an error on any certification round where predicate P does not hold. We similarly define the certi-
fication protocol to be complete if no node signals an error in any round where predicate P holds.
In this paper we will focus our attention on predicates for which sound and complete certification
protocols exist. Our current results do not address the question of what class of predicates can be
correctly checked using distributed certification protocols, and we hope to address this question in
future work. We discuss this point in greater detail in §5.
Beyond correctness we also impose a few efficiency requirements on the certification protocols
considered in this paper. These efficiency requirements, which minimize the number and size of
messages used for certification, are designed to allow practical deployments of these protocols
without requiring operators and developers to add significant network resources to existing systems.
Specifically, we require that during each certification round, each node send no more than O(1)
messages, and each message sent by the certification protocol be no more than O(log n) bytes long.
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In practice, during failure-free operations, our certification protocols for agreement and validity
require sending no more than one message per-node per-certification round, and the messages sent
are of constant size. In addition to ensuring that nodes send a fixed number of small messages,
we also aim to ensure that our certification protocols require each node to communicate with
only a few neighboring nodes. The concept of what nodes are neighboring here can be decided
on by operators, thus enabling the use of certification in deployments where some nodes might
be in the same datacenter, while others might only be accessible over a wide area network and
thus communication between different sets of nodes imposes different costs. A key focus of our
future work is to design a framework for automatically generating efficient and correct certification
protocols for a wide range of predicates, which we discuss in §4.
3 Certification of Consensus Protocols
In this section we make concrete the notion of distributed certification protocols by developing
protocols that can be used to check the correctness of distributed consensus protocols [19]. We
focus on consensus protocols since they have been widely studied: we have theoretical bounds
on what a consensus protocol can achieve [8], a wide range of consensus protocols have been
developed [6, 18, 24], targetting a range of different network models (asynchronous, synchronous
and partially synchronous) and a range of failure models [3]. Furthermore, consensus protocols are
widely deployed in practical systems [2, 15], forming a critical part of how distributed datastores
and systems ensure consistency. Errors in the implementation of these systems can thus affect data
consistency and the availability of web services, and thus mechanisms for checking and preserving
the correctness of these systems are of practical importance.
3.1 Safety Properties Considered
We consider consensus protocols where each node receives 0 or more proposals and all nodes exe-
cute a protocol to agree (i.e., choose) a single proposal that they then output. We built certification
proposals for two safety properties that are satisfied by all consensus protocols [19]:
Agreement: which requires that all nodes executing a consensus protocol output the same value.
Validity: which request that the agreed upon value was proposed. Equivalently, each node receives
a set of proposals, and validity requires that a value output by the consensus protocol be contained
union of the sets of proposals across nodes.
3.2 Certification Protocol
Here we provide a brief overview of our protocols for checking agreement and validity, which we
present in greater detail below. Both protocols represent circuits which are evaluated over inputs
distributed across nodes, the agreement circuit checks for cases where nearby nodes disagree on the
chosen value, while the validity circuit checks to see whether or any nearby node has a proposal
providing validity of the chosen value. To implement these protocols we therefore need a notion of
nearby nodes, and we need to arrange nodes in a topology that allows each node to send a message
to one or a few neighbors (so we can meet our efficiency goals) while still ensuring evaluation across
all nodes. Our approach to doing so is to arrange the nodes in a spanning tree, and then embedding
the circuit on this spanning tree. We allow users of our framework to specify how the spanning tree
is create, and they can rely on protocols such as Perlman’s spanning tree protocol [28] or any other
protocol including ones that consider the underlying physical network over which communication
is performed. Since the spanning tree is computed by a user specified protocol, we also certify that
the spanning tree computed is in fact correct, i.e., it is structurally a tree, and spans all nodes.
We begin by presenting certification protocols for the spanning tree, agreement and validity in
the failure free case. We present our mechanisms for handling failures in §3.3, however we note that
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this mechanism requires little more than recomputing and re-certifying the spanning tree, for which
we again call into the user provided algorithm. We now present these protocols in greater detail.
3.2.1 Certifying a Spanning Tree
As specified above, our framework is designed to allow users to use an arbitrary protocol for
constructing a spanning tree. We require the output from this spanning tree construction to be
supplied to each node as a six tuple comprising of:
• A unique ID for the node. We assume that these ID’s are totally ordered – this allows for
integer IDs, IDs based on network address, etc.,
• A list of IDs for all active nodes in the system.
• The ID of the tree’s root.
• The ID of the node’s parent in the spanning tree, or null in case the node is the root.
• A list of IDs of the node’s children, or null in case the node is a lead.
• Finally, the node’s distance from the root.
As mentioned above, we need to certify the correctness of this input, for which we rely on
techniques which have already described in prior work including the work of Korman et al [17] and
Naor et al [21]. Certifying the correctness of this input requires checking structural properties of
the supplied graph, i.e., ensuring that the graph is acyclic, has a single root and spans all nodes;
and checking that node IDs are unique.
To check that the graph is acyclic and has a single root we have each node send its parent (if
any) the ID of the root node and its distance from the root. The parent then ensures that the root
node supplied to it as a part of its input is the same as the root node supplied to its children,
and that the distance from any of its children to the root is greater than its distance to the root.
Checking that a parents root agrees with its children ensures that the supplied graph cannot be
a connected forest, i.e., it ensures that the supplied graph either has one root or is disconnected.
This is because for the graph to have two roots which are connected, there must be sibling nodes
which disagree on the ID of the root, in which case at least one of them must also disagree about
the root ID with its parent. Checking distances ensures that the graph is acyclic.
Next, we need to check that the graph spans all nodes, this is done by having each node, starting
with the leaves send their parent a message containing the number of nodes in the subgraph rooted
at that node. For leaf nodes, this simply requires sending 1, while any non-leaf nodes add up the
counts received from their children, and add one to this sum before sending it to their parent. Once
the root has computed this value it checks whether the computed value equals n, in which case the
supplied graph does span all nodes, and reports an error otherwise.
The procedure thus far is sufficient for proving structural properties of the graph, however
it cannot prove that nodes have unique IDs. To prove uniqueness we adopt a multi-set equality
protocol described in Naor et al [21], however in adopting this protocol we needed to make minor
modifications to allow its use in a setting where nodes cannot interact with a designated centralized
prover. We describe this protocol and our changes next.
3.2.2 Certifying Unique IDs
We show pseudocode for a protocol that can be used to certify that IDs are unique in Algo-
rithm 1. The core of this protocol is the multi-set equality protocol proposed in Naor et al [21],
and the only changes are to allow this protocol to be executed in the absence of a random oracle
and without a centralized prover. We briefly explain the original protocol before explaining our
technique for eliminating the use of a random oracle and some performance trade-offs this offers.
First, in order to use a set equality protocol we need to show that the checking uniqueness of
IDs can be reduced to multi-set equality. In §3.2.1 we required that IDs have a total order, and that
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Algorithm 1 Protocol for certifying that node IDs are unique
1: procedure CertifyUniqueID( ) . The outer function called to check uniqueness of IDs
2: for i := 0 .. n do . Assuming n nodes in the system
3: CheckUniqueID(i)
4: end for
5: end procedure
6: procedure CheckUniqueID(v) . Run at a node to check if all nodes have unique IDs
7: msgs← recv() . Receive messages from all children.
8: CheckSetEquality(v, id, succ id, msgs) . id is the node’s ID, succ id is the successor ID.
9: end procedure
10: procedure CheckSetEquality(v, a, b, msgs) . Check equality between set A and B
. a ∈ A is the value from A at the current node.
. b ∈ B is the value from B at the current node.
11: p0← v − a
12: p1← v − b
13: for m ∈ msgs do
14: p0← p0×m[0]
15: p1← p1×m[1]
16: end for
17: if IsRoot() then . Is the current node the root
18: if p1− p0 6= 0 then . Check if sets differ
19: SignalError( ) . Signal an error
20: end if
21: else
22: Send(parent, (p0, p1)) . Send a tuple of products to parent
23: end if
24: end procedure
each node be provided with a list of all IDs. We define the successor of an ID i to be the smallest
valid ID i′ that is greater than i. If there is no valid ID larger than some ID i, then we define its
successor to be the smallest valid ID in the system. This puts node IDs in a ring. Next we consider
two sets: the multi-set I of IDs assigned to each node, and the multi-set S of successors to each
node’s ID. We note that each node is provided i ∈ I as input, and can use this and the list of IDs
to compute the corresponding element s ∈ S. Finally observe that I = S if and only if each node
has a unique ID. As a result, we can see that checking uniqueness requires us to use a distributed
multi-set equality protocol to check equality between I and S and running a local check to check
that each ID in the list of IDs is unique. In Algorithm 1 we assume that all nodes have already
checked that the provided list does not contain duplicate IDs.
The multi-set equality protocol itself relies on polynomial evaluation to check equality. First we
note that given a set A = {a0, a1, . . . an}, where ai is an integer drawn from some finite field1 one
can construct and evaluate the polynomial function FA(x) =
∏
(x − ai) for any point x using an
arithmetic circuit embedded in a spanning tree (which we are given as input, and whose structure we
have already checked using the procedure described in the previous section). We show an evaluation
mechanism for this polynomial on lines 11, 14 and 22 of Algorithm 1. Next, observe that given two
degree n polynomial FA and FB, the polynomial FA − FB must either be 0 at no more than n
points, or FA and FB must be equal (and thus the difference must be identically 0). This is because
in the case where FA 6= FB, FA − FB is a degree n polynomial, and hence has at most n distinct
roots. Given this we can now construct polynomials FI and FS from sets I and S as defined in the
previous paragraph, and then use this polynomial to check set equality.
In Naor et al’s work this check is performed by picking points at random from a field of size
n3, and evaluating FI − FS on these random points. One can bound the probability of any point
picked at random being a root of FI − FS , and hence can evaluate this polynomial difference on a
1To treat elements in this manner we treat fixed length elements as integers represented by their binary represen-
tation, or rely on cryptographic hash functions in cases where elements might be variable length.
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constant number of points to check multi-set equality. However, in our setting we neither assume
a random oracle, nor a designated prover who can broadcast a set of random numbers. We resolve
this in Algorithm 1 by evaluating the difference on the range [0, n] which consists of n + 1 points.
While this suffices for correctness, it is inefficient requiring each node to send O(n log n) bits each
time it is executed.
However, we note that in practice node IDs rarely change, e.g., they are unlikely to change during
normal operation or due to node failures. As a result, this certification process runs infrequently,
likely only in cases where new nodes are added, and if we can assume that IDs remain constant for
at least O(n) certification rounds, then we find that our relatively simple protocol requires nodes
to send out an amortized O(1) bits each time uniqueness has to be certified, and is thus efficient
in practice. However, even when ID uniqueness has to be certified more frequently, we can make
use of the root of the spanning tree to further increase efficiency, by having the root compute a
set of random numbers and then having them propagate through the tree before executing the
certification procedure described above. While this increases efficiency, it comes at the cost of
increased protocol complexity.
3.2.3 Certifying Agreement
Algorithm 2 Protocol for certifying agreement between nodes.
1: procedure CertifyAgreement(d, msgs) . d is the output (decision) of the local consensus implementation
. msgs is the set of messages received from the node’s children.
2: for m ∈ msgs do
3: if m 6= d then . Check if a child has decided on a different value
4: SignalError( ) . Signal an error
5: end if
6: end for
7: Send(parent, d) . Send this node’s decision to its parent.
8: end procedure
Having described how during initialization certification agents need to be organized in a span-
ning tree, and how to certify correctness for this spanning tree, we now turn to certifying the
correctness of the consensus protocol itself. We start by describing our protocol for checking agree-
ment, which we show in Algorithm 2. For ease of exposition, we show only the core of this and
the validity certification algorithm, and we assume that the CertifyAgreement procedure is called
similarly to the CheckSetEquality procedure in Listing 1 (line 8), i.e., a calling procedure first
waits to receive messages from all children, collects these messages in a set msgs and then calls
CertifyAgreement with the input from the implementation and the set msgs.
The certification protocol simply requires that each node check whether the decision reached
by it differs from the decision reached by any of its children (lines 2—6). If so the node signals an
error (line 4), and independent of whether an error is signalled it forwards its local decision to its
parent (line 7). This protocol ensures completeness since any node signally an error must have
observed a case where the value it has decided on differs from the value one of its children have
decided on, i.e., an error is signalled only when the protocol observes disagreement between two
nodes. The protocol provides soundness because equality is transitive, and our use of a spanning
tree ensures that we perform a transitive equality check between any two nodes in the system.
In terms of efficiency, each node sends a single message at each round of this protocol. For
any consensus protocol where the agreed value is of constant size, this message is also of constant
size. However, one could use a consensus protocol to decide on values whose size depends on the
number of nodes in the system (e.g., in case the consensus protocol is used to decide on a schedule
of nodes). In this later case we use a cryptographic hash function to map this arbitrary length
value to a constant hash string. Since standard assumptions about cryptographic hash functions
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imply that two distinct values do not hash to the same value with high probability, our protocol
ensures soundness and completeness with high probability in this case. Finally, we note that while
this protocol has low message complexity, it requires as many rounds of communication as the
height of the spanning tress which can mean requiring O(n) rounds in the worse case. However,
we note that a good choice of spanning trees (e.g., one with height 1) can be used to reduce the
number of rounds required, and flexibility in choosing the tree can be used in practice to optimize
communication patterns – e.g., reducing the number of messages sent on links connecting multiple
data centers.
3.2.4 Certifying Validity
Algorithm 3 Protocol for certifying validity.
1: procedure CertifyValidity((d, P ), msgs) . d is the output (decision) of the local consensus implementation.
. P is the set of proposals received by the node.
. msgs is the set of messages received from the node’s children.
2: c← false
3: for p ∈ P do
4: c← c ∨ (p = d)
5: end for
6: for m ∈ msgs do
7: c← c ∨m
8: end for
9: if IsRoot( ) then . The complete certificate is only visible to the root.
10: if ¬c then
11: SignalError( )
12: end if
13: else
14: Send(c) . Send the certificate for the subtree rooted at this node to its parent.
15: end if
16: end procedure
We present our protocol for certifying validity in Algorithm 3. Certifying validity requires that
we find at least one node where the value decided by the consensus algorithm was proposed (§3.1).
Our procedure for certifying validity requires that one also check agreement using the protocol in
§3.2.3, however these protocols can be run concurrently. For generality, we also assume that a single
node may receive an arbitrary number of proposals.
Given these assumptions our algorithm starts by first checking if local information is sufficient
to certify validity, i.e., did the current node receive a proposal with the same value as the one that
was decided (lines 3—5). Next, we use logical disjunction (i.e., the or function) to combine the
boolean value of this local certificate with certificates received from the node’s children (lines 6—8).
Each node then forwards this combined certificate to its parent. Note that the combined certificate
can be used to check whether any node in the subtree rooted at the current node can certify validity.
As a result the root’s certificate signifies whether any node in the entire network can certify validity,
and as a result the root signals an error (Line 9 in case its computed certificate is false.
Since no node except for the root signals errors in this protocol, completeness is preserved
as long as the root’s computed certificate is correct. Soundness is similarly a consequence of the
root’s computed certificate being correct. We observe that starting from the leaf of the tree a local
certificate is true if and only if a node has a proposal that proves validity. Furthermore, for any
non-leaf node n the combined certificate is true if and only if node n has seen a protocol proving
validity or there is a path from some node n′ to n, where n′ has seen such a proposal. As a result
for the computed certificate to be true at the root, there must be a node that is contained in the
spanning tree (thus ensuring there is a path from the node to the root) which has a proposal proving
validity, and must be false otherwise. This ensures safety and completeness.
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The efficiency of this protocol is similar to the agreement protocol in §3.2.3, except that all
messages carry a single boolean value.
3.3 Handling Failures in Fail Stop Environments
Thus far in our exposition we have no considered cases where nodes might fail. We designed our
current protocol to deal with fail-stop errors. We observe that a failed node can disrupt the structure
of the spanning tree our protocols rely on. As a result when a node fails we need to recompute a new
spanning tree, a task for which we can use existing protocols including the well-known spanning
tree protocol [28]. Once a new spanning has been computed, we rely on the certification protocol
in §3.2.1 to check structural properties of the spanning tree. We assume node IDs do not change as
a result of failures, and thus do not execute CertifyUniqueID (§3.2.2).
Once a new spanning tree has been computed, we can now again use the protocols described
in §3.2.3 and §3.2.4 to check agreement and validity. However, in this case failures might result in
cases where our check for agreement is not sound (i.e., we do not detect a case where agreement is
violated) or in cases where our check for validity is not complete (i.e., we return an error even when
a valid proposal exists). This is because we do not have visibility into the state at failed nodes, so
in cases where a node communicates an incorrect decision to an external entity and then fails, our
agreement check will not in fact observe a violation and hence will not signal an error. Similar, if
the failing node is the only node in the system to have seen a proposal that validates the selected
value, then our validation protocol cannot observe this proof and hence will generate an error where
non exists. To address this problem, we modify our definitions of soundness and completeness to
only consider data that is visible to certification agents during a certification round. Specifically,
we now define a certification protocol which evaluates a predicate P to be sound if at least one
node signals an error on any certification round where predicate P does not hold for inputs from
non-faulty nodes. We similarly define the certification protocol to be complete if no node signals
an error in any round where predicate P holds for inputs from non-faulty nodes.
Finally, we conjecture that this gap in soundness and completeness is fundamental, and no
certification protocol can ensure soundness and correctness while considering the data at failed
nodes, without assuming knowledge of the distributed system implementation.
3.4 Putting it All Together
Algorithm 4 Overall protocol for certifying consensus.
1: procedure CertifyConsensus((agreement, proposals))
2: m← recv() . Receive messages from children
3: CertifyAgreement(agreement, m)
4: m← recv() . Receive messages from children
5: CertifyValidity((agreement, proposals))
6: end procedure
7: procedure DetectFailure( )
8: RecomputeSpanningTree( )
9: CertifySpanningTreeStructure( ) . Check structural properties of the spanning tree.
10: end procedure
11: procedure Initialize( )
12: RecomputeSpanningTree( )
13: CertifySpanningTreeStructure( )
14: CertifyUniqueID( )
15: end procedure
Finally, we summarize the protocol executed by certification agents for consensus in Algorithm 4.
Certification agents run the initialization function (line 11 when the system is started, whenever
node IDs change, or whenever a new node is added to the system; they respond to failures by
recomputing the spanning tree and checking spanning tree structure (DetectFailure, line 7); and
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respond to certification requests from the implementation by certifying agreement and validity
(CertifyConsensus, line 1). We note that while for ease of exposition we separate checking for
agreement and validity into separate phases in Algorithm 4, they are trivially combined into one
phase where each node combines messages from both protocols into a single tuple.
4 Certificates for Other Protocols
In the previous section we presented a certification protocol for consensus. We now turn our
attention to generalizing this certification framework so it can both be used to certify additional
distributed protocol. What is desirable in generalizing this framework would be to find a procedure
that takes as input programmers supplied predicates, and the generates an efficient certification pro-
tocol for checking these predicates. We can then rely on existing work (such as the code generation
tools described in §1) to generate code for certification agents.
Thus, an important question in generalizing the certification framework in this way is to de-
termine the types of predicates for which we can automatically generate efficient protocols. This
is an open question, that we are currently working on, but the construction in §3 provides some
early hints on what might be possible. In particular, the protocol for checking validity in §3.2.4
indicates that boolean formulas whose inputs are distributed across nodes of distributed system can
be efficiently evaluated; the certificate for spanning tree structure in §3.2.1 show so can arithmetic
circuits including ones which either count the number of elements or add up values at different
nodes; and the protocol for checking agreement in §3.2.3 shows that we can also efficiently check
equality for a fixed number of values.
More generally, we also see some hope in the recent results from Naor et al [21], which describes
a compiler that can be used to convert any centralized verifier that can run in O(n) time on a
RAM machine into a 3-round distributed protocol that can be executed in the interactive proof
setting. It is unclear whether this result can be translated to our scenario in general, since the
construction itself depends on the prover to execute the verifier algorithm while recording a trace,
after which the verifiers use a multi-set equality protocol to check the correctness of this trace.
In our case we do not assume a distinguished prover, and assuming otherwise would require the
prover to have information about all nodes in the implementation. However, despite the challenges
of adapting this approach to our setting, we continue to investigate how to apply these results to
our setting. Finally, it is also unclear whether predicates for all safety properties can be expressed
as O(n) algorithms, e.g., when certifying conflict-serializability [27] in a distributed database, one
may need a predicate over the set of transactions, requiring the use of an algorithm with higher
asymptotic complexity.
5 Discussion
Next, we briefly discuss a few additional questions and concerns about certification, before
presenting a survey of related work and concluding.
Using Certification Protocols Thus far in the paper we have not addressed the question of
how implementors and operators might use certification protocols. In particular, since on predicate
violation any arbitrary node can output an error message, it seems unclear how one might use this
message, e.g., using such a mechanism as a means to revert erroneous processing would require
any error message to be broadcast to all nodes which might itself require execution of an atomic
broadcast protocol. Our original intention with certification protocols was to provide a mechanism
that could warn developers and operators of erroneous runs, allowing them to then use offline
processes to analyze and fix the error. The protocols described thus far suffice for this purpose. In
future work we hope to develop additional mechanisms that might be used by implementations to
automatically react to certification errors.
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Choice of failure models Our choice of the fail-stop failure model might appear strange in the
context of certification, where we are trying to check whether an implementation is bug free, since
it requires that we place some trust in the implementation so that inputs to the certification agent
are correct. In general we chose the fail-stop model for simplicity, and also because we assume
that implementation are not malicious, merely buggy. In this non-malicious setting we assume that
implementations do not deliberately send incorrect inputs to the certification agent. Extending our
framework for a more realistic byzantine setting requires us to consider clients, who consume the
output from the original distributed system, and is left to future work.
6 Related Work
We have already discussed some of the related work in earlier section of the work, particularly
to work on distributing verifiers in interactive proof systems [16,21] which our protocols build on.
The work that is closest to the problem we address is the work on proof labeling scheme first
initiated by Korman et al [17]. The main goal of this proof labeling work was to certify that network
configuration met some boolean predicate, e.g., certifying that nodes were arranged in a spanning
tree or in a clique, nodes had been assigned colors correctly to prove the graph was 3-colorable, etc.
Much of the focus this work has been on determining bounds on the label size (which corresponds
to the size of the input from the implementation in our model). While our work builds on some of
the construction in the proof labeling literature, we differ in two significant ways: first, the class
of predicates we consider are different – our focus is on allowing distributed systems to repeatedly
certify their behavior and not on checking topological properties of the network; second, in our
setting where certification is run repeatedly failure handling is an important concern to address.
To the best of our knowledge, prior work on proof labeling schemes have not considered failures.
There are also close analogs to our certification method and to a proposal from Varghese and
Lynch [32] for developing self-stabilizing algorithms [5]. In this proposal, nodes perform local checks
of correctness and execute a protocol to fix any detected violations. Certification serves a similar
purpose to the local checks used in this work, however, while our certification protocol could be
used in a similar setting, this is not our primary goal.
There is also a large body of work focused on runtime monitoring and verification of distributed
systems (see [11] for a survey). Similar to our work, these efforts aim to detect and signal cases where
the behavior of a distributed system deviates from some specified behavior. However, different from
our work, these efforts do so by collecting consistent logs from across the system and analyzing these
logs. Consistent log collection is enabled by including vector clocks or other ordering information
in messages, this approach is also adopted by logging systems such as Dapper [31] and XTrace [10].
Compared to certification protocols, these approaches increase the size of each message, adding
significant overheads.
7 Conclusion
There is significant interest in ensuring correctness for distributed systems, and as a result there
has been significant recent work addressing this problem. Much of this work has focused on mecha-
nisms for building distributed systems that are correct-by-construction. While the results in this area
have been promising, this approach to correctness requires abandoning existing implementations
and implicitly trusting the tools that generate these correct-by-construction implementations. In
reality both these requirements are hard to meet – existing implementations usually provide richer
functionality than new correct-by-construction implementations, and have often been extensively
tested to meet correctness and performance requirements in deployments. In this work we suggest
a different approach, where runtime certification is used to efficiently check the correctness of dis-
tributed system implementations. We have shown that such certification protocols can be used to
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check agreement and validity for consensus protocols, and we are now working on determining what
set of safety properties are amenable to being checked using certification protocols.
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